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Sentimental Ambiguities and the American 
Founding:
The Double Origins of Political Sympathy in The
Federalist Papers
Zoltán Vajda
In the Fourteenth Federalist, attempting to contribute to the project 
of winning political support for the proposed constitution of 1787, James 
Madison made a bold statement about “the people of America,” who, 
according to him, were “… knit together … by so many cords of 
affection.”1 In his reasoning, the document would sanction a national 
community already based on existing affective ties. Nevertheless, as 
revealed in other pieces of the Federalist Papers, the would-be federal 
system was, at the same time, in lack of such bonds, and the authors of 
the collection, in part, offered the document to create other such ties, ones 
that had not been present before. Thus in The Federalist the constitution 
appears, in a sense, as an ambiguous framework which was for both 
legitimizing a national community, federal in scope, and was legitimized 
by it. This ambiguity was, at the same time, intimately linked with a 
contemporary set of ideas derived from the culture of sensibility and 
concerned the origins of national bonds circumscribing two different 
conceptions of those affective ties.
In this essay, I propose to address one particular aspect of the 
notions of sympathy and affection as they emerged in The Federalist. My 
interest lies in the ways that Publius identified the origins of affectionate 
social ties in the Union with special regard to the tension between the 
local and national spheres of power. More particularly, my aim is to 
1 James Madison, Alexander Hamilton, and John Jay, The Federalist Papers, ed. Isaac 
Kramnick (Harmondsworth, 1987) (henceforth cited as Federalist), 144.
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explore the modes in which, in the Papers, national ties of affection 
originating in various factors served to bridge the distance between 
members of the federal political community. How many sources of those 
“cords of affection” would exist in the federal Union?—one might 
respond to Madison’s claim above. As far as their origins are concerned, I 
argue, John Jay, Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison, the three 
authors of The Federalist, utilized two kinds of discourse in the 
sentimental mode. They, in fact, employed a double discourse of political 
affection and sympathy suggesting two, diametrically opposed sources of 
origin for sentimental bonds in the federal republic. The first of these 
posited the nation-to-be under the new constitution, in part, as a result of 
development, chiefly related to the Revolution, with emphasis on 
affectionate bonds connecting members of the nation. Thus it also 
exploited the power of natural proximity and local affectionate sentiments 
in an effort to make the federal-national government appeal to the people 
of the states. Different from, yet closely linked with this, the second 
discourse posited the same (federal) nation as an already existing one, a 
sentimental community by nature with bonds of affection naturally 
derived either from kinship ties or from others already connecting various 
political actors of the federal system. The first discourse, as will be seen, 
had its force at the federal level only, whereas the second had the state as 
well as the federal levels for its scope thereby contributing to an intricate 
network of bonds of political affection and sympathy in the Federalist 
Papers.
In the past two decades a growing scholarly interest has developed 
in the philosophy and culture of sensibility and sentimentalism in relation 
to the political discourse of mid-and late-eighteenth-century America. 
Groundbreaking research has highlighted the extent to which major 
political concerns of the era were intertwined with the “culture of 
feeling.” As a result of this work we now have a better sense of the 
relevance of concepts such as “sympathy,” “affection,” “benevolence,” 
“consanguinity,” or “brotherhood,” in a political context each related to 
the capacity of the individual of sharing the sentiments of fellow human 
beings. Derived from contemporary western moral philosophy they 
became stock elements of the American colonists’ assessment of their 
relations to Britain and came to inform their vision of social ties holding 
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their community together following independence.2 However, none of the 
pertaining works pay attention to the origins of political sympathy in the 
Federalist, failing to identify the different stances of Publius on these two
discourses.
Examining how affection comes to be in The Federalist can also 
qualify claims about the differences among its contributors. In a recent 
article, Todd Estes has argued how, in response to anti-Federalist 
arguments, writers of the Papers framed the issues of debate in different 
ways, opting for different rhetorical “strategies” and “voices” ranging 
from an avid support for ratification (Hamilton), through the assertion of 
“national greatness” (Jay) to a more deliberative, meditating voice 
(Madison), weighing pros and cons in view of ratification.3 However, my 
analysis will hopefully show that because of their use of the ambiguous 
discourse of political sentimentalism, the three authors of the Papers also 
had a great deal in common. 
Literature on ratification including discussions of the place of the 
Federalist Papers is voluminous and is predominantly concerned with the 
political ideas, the narrative history or the rhetorical strategies presented 
in the debate. Recent works have tended to concentrate on the process of 
framing and ratification in the states, yet with no interest in the influence 
of the contemporary culture of sensibility. Of works with less narrative 
and more analytical orientation, Max Edling’s treatment of the making of 
2 For works of broader scope discussing the major features of sensibility and 
sentimentalism with focus on the English speaking world see Janet Todd, Sensibility: 
An Introduction (London, 1986); John Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability: The 
Language of Feeling in the Eighteenth Century (Oxford, 1990); and June Howard, 
“What is Sentimentality?” American Literary History 11 (1999), 63–81. For the 
American political scene see Garry Wills, Inventing America: Jefferson’s Declaration 
of Independence (New York, 1979, first ed. 1978); Jay Fliegelman, Prodigals and 
Pilgrims: The American Revolution against Patriarchal Authority, 1750–1800
(Cambridge, 1982); Gordon S. Wood, The Radicalism of the American Revolution
(New York, 1991); David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making 
of American Nationalism, 1776–1820 (Chapel Hill, 1997); Andrew Burstein, 
Sentimental Democracy: The Evolution of America’s Romantic Self-Image (New York, 
1999); Andrew Burstein, “The Political Character of Sympathy,” Journal of the Early 
Republic, 21 (2001), 601–32; and Sarah Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution
(Chapel Hill, 2009). “Sensibility” and “sentimentalism” were by and large used in the 
same sense in the contemporary terminology. On this see Todd, Sensibility, 6.
3 Todd Estes, “The Voices of Publius and the Strategies of Persuasion in The 
Federalist”, Journal of the Early Republic, 28 (2008), 526–7.
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the constitution as an attempt to create a nation state, European style, also 
ignores the culture of sensibility. Similarly, in his widely acclaimed 
analysis of the drafting, making, and implementing the constitution, Jack 
Rakove, concerned with the changing meanings and interpretation of the 
document, also addresses issues with some relevance to sentimentalism 
yet with no awareness of its influence on the debate.4
4 For studies on the making of the constitution and the ratification debate see Robert L. 
Utley, Jr., ed., Principles of the Constitutional Order: The Ratification Debates
(Lanham, 1989); Herman Belz, Ronald Hoffman, and Peter J. Albert, eds., To Form a 
More Perfect Union: The Critical Ideas of the Constitution (Charlottesville, 1992); 
Leonard W. Levy and Dennis J. Mahoney, eds., The Framing and Ratification of the 
Constitution (London, 1987); Michael Lienesch, New Order of the Ages: Time, the 
Constitution, and the Making of Modern American Political Thought (Princeton, 
1988); Terence Ball and J. G. A. Pocock, eds., Conceptual Change and the 
Constitution (Lawrence, 1988); Jack N. Rakove, Original Meanings: Politics and 
Ideas in the Making of the Constitution (New York, 1997); Richard Beeman, Stephen 
Botein, and Edward C. Carter II, eds., Beyond Confederation: Origins of the 
Constitution and American National Identity (Chapel Hill, 1987); Ellen Frankel Paul 
and Howard Dickman, eds., Liberty, Property, and the Foundations of the American 
Constitution (Albany, 1989); Of two recent works, for instance, Richard Beeman’s is 
primarily a detailed and meticulously constructed narrative account of the 
Constitutional Convention with a brief gesturing to the ratification process and a 
survey of the issues discussed by the delegates. Labeling the Federalist Papers as 
“political propaganda,” serving the actual political goals of people like Madison, who 
had previously held different views of the provisions of the document, Beeman, 
nonetheless, makes no attempt to examine the role of contemporary ideas of sensibility 
in the debate. Also in a recent narrative history, Pauline Maier provides a magisterial 
study of the ratification process in the various states, emphasizing how in one state it 
was influenced by events in another and discusses major political issues as they shaped 
the debate. Yet, although she does refer to the problem of sympathy between 
representatives and the people as an issue in the New York ratification debate, the role 
of sentimental culture in the parties’ arguments falls outside her scope. Richard 
Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution (New York, 
2009), 207 (quotation), 207–8; Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the 
Constitution, 1787–1788 (New York, 2010), 354. Max M. Edling, A Revolution in 
Favor of Government: Origins of the U.S. Constitution and the Making of the 
American State (Oxford, 2003); Rakove treats, among others, the issue of 
representation, pointing out how anti-Federalists employed the argument about the 
need for sympathy between federal representatives and the people as a guarantee 
“against the abuse of power.” Yet he connects this stance simply to an older political 
model of representation without addressing the issue in a sentimental context, and like 
the other cited scholars offers no analysis of either how Publius thought of its 
philosophical foundations, its nature or the mechanism of its attainment. Rakove, 
Original Meanings, 205 (quotation), 236–7.
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Works that have paid some scholarly attention to the Federalist 
Papers from the point of view of sentimentalism nonetheless treat 
political affection as one homogeneous discourse failing to note its 
different origins as articulated by Publius.5 In what is the most 
comprehensive study to date of the links between the ratification debate 
and sentimentalism historian Sarah Knott has shown how issues of the 
controversy were, to a great extent, embedded in the culture of sensibility 
and, more particularly, how Federalists imagined the American political 
community as one bound together by ties of sympathy. As part of her 
argument, she also claims that similarly to their political opponents, yet 
unrecognized by historians, Federalist writers, including Publius, amply 
drew upon the language of sensibility the project of the Federalists in 
order to move beyond localism represented by the anti-Federalists and to 
identify ties of sympathy within the Union denied by the latter.6
Knott’s analysis, however, also fails to explore the different origins 
of political sympathy and affection in the Federalist Papers and suggests
their homogeneous nature in the documents, whereas it was, as I aim to 
5 Of these, Gary Wills’s brief analysis which discusses political sympathy within the 
context of assessing David Hume’s influence on Madison’s thought, remains cursory, 
only treating Madison’s adoption of the notion of affection in politics from Hume’s 
writings on parties, simply highlighting the former’s concern with the danger of the 
people’s attachments to legislators as an impediment to control over the latter. Garry 
Wills, Explaining America: The Federalist (New York, 1981), 34–7. Similar is the 
case with historian David Waldstreicher’s sweeping analysis of celebratory political 
practices in the early national period. Briefly addressing the problem of sensibility 
when examining the sphere of political celebrations as a platform for acting out 
national feelings, his treatment of textual representation of the boundaries of the 
federal national community includes no systematic study of The Federalist from a 
sentimental perspective. Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes, chapter 2. In 
another relevant analysis, political scientist Leonard Sorenson has dealt with the 
document with focus on sentimental issues in discussing Madison’s theory of virtue 
and ambition as well as their role in making a precondition for the existence of a 
republic like the federal Union. Offering an analysis of sympathy between the people 
and their representatives as well as addressing the problem of similarity between 
people and federal magistrates through fear of oppression, or “temporary affection” 
between them Sorenson nonetheless fails to probe into the origins of such sentiments 
from the perspective of the culture of sentimentalism. See Leonard R. Sorenson, 
“Madison on Sympathy, Virtue, and Ambition in the ‘Federalist Papers’,” Polity 27 
(1995), 435–7, 437–8, 441 (quotation).
6 Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, 241, 244, 255, 242, 254, 250, 260,
257–8.
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show here, more diverse, at least as far as its origins are concerned. Her 
argument treats fellow-feeling in The Federalist as a homogeneous 
concept, ignoring differences in its use and hence cannot account for the 
strategy of Publius, who suggested the presence of proximity in various 
segments of the proposed political system offering a more complex 
system of affection than it seems at first sight.7
The eighteenth-century conception of affection was part of a 
broader intellectual and cultural framework usually described as the “cult 
of feeling” or the culture of sensibility. Although originating in Lockean 
perceptional psychology as well as in scientific interest in sense 
experience, by the mid-eighteenth century it became associated with the 
concept of sympathy, denoting the capacity of humans to respond to the 
feelings of fellow human beings and to communicate their own 
sentiments. Although with significant differences as for the mechanism of 
sympathy along with other related moral virtues such as benevolence or 
affection, British moral philosophers from Anthony Ashley Cooper, the 
Third Earl of Shaftesbury through Frances Hutcheson, Lord Kames 
(Henry Home), David Hume, and Adam Smith nonetheless unanimously 
emphasized the primacy of these concepts in establishing and maintaining 
human society through their function to bridge the gap between 
individuals, moving them beyond the basic drive of self-interest. This was 
in sharp contrast to conceptual models such as the ones professed by 
Thomas Hobbes and Bernard Mandeville which posited self-interest as 
the exclusive motive of individual conduct.8
7 Understanding the significance of the ambiguous origins of sympathy in The 
Federalist, at the same time, also allows for a reconsideration of the sharp dividing 
line that Knott posits between the anti-Federalists and the Federalists as far as 
sentimental politics are concerned. She argues that while the anti-Federalists 
advocated a “mimetic” mode of sympathy, which, based on the principle of 
“resemblance,” stressed the possibility of affection between similar, homogeneous 
entities such as the ones constituting the individual states of the Union, the Federalists 
promoted a “superlative” version of sympathy asserting affinity beyond localism 
encompassing the entire federal Union (ibid, 244). The former fit the idea of localism 
and the ideal of the small republic with a homogeneous population, whereas the latter 
assumed affection across boundaries of heterogeneity, thereby supporting the idea of 
the large republic and the federal Union. (ibid, 243–4) Nevertheless, as will be seen 
below, in fact, Publius also made use of the claim about the power of localism when 
identifying natural ties of sympathy at the federal level. 
8 See Todd, Sensibiliy, esp. 24–7, Mullan, Sentiment and Sociability, esp. 18–56; 
Michael Bell, Sentimentalism, Ethics and the Culture of Feeling (Houndmills, 2000), 
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In the North-American colonies of Britain the notion that a political 
community was to be cemented by bonds of affection developed from a 
special conception of the family. A fundamental social unit, family was 
originally seen as being based on patriarchal bonds of mutual affections 
required from children and parents: while their offspring were expected to 
show obedient affection to parents, the latter were obliged to reciprocate 
by showing appropriate parental love. This conception of family relations, 
however, as historian Jay Fliegelman has shown, underwent a decisive 
transformation: from the mid-eighteenth century on the parent-child 
relationship became more and more grounded in the sentimental ethos of 
affection. Patriarchal authority as a principle governing that relationship 
came to be replaced by the expectation for parents to guide the moral and
intellectual development of their children, leading them toward 
independent adulthood. As a result, ideological emphasis was shifting 
from “nature” to “nurture” in the period, meaning that bonds developing 
as a result of education as nurture could be of the same strength as bonds 
of consanguinity, that is, the outcome of birth. Therefore, for instance, it 
became culturally acceptable for surrogate fathers to replace those of 
nature as long as their sentiments for family members were grounded in 
affection. Likewise, familial ties by birth, in general, were increasingly 
seen as accidental and replaceable by ones based on affectionate 
nurturing. All this, however, also implied that such bonds could be 
developed as a result of habit through “habituation,” that affection could 
be generated through development, instead of being seen as automatically 
derived from consanguinal ties.9
Ubiquitous as they may have been, moral sentiments including 
affection, as members of the American political elite could learn from 
16–17. For the Scottish thinkers’ general influence in the early Republic, see Richard 
B. Sher, “Introduction: Scottish-American Cultural Studies, Past and Present,” in 
Richard B. Sher and Jeffrey R. Smitten, eds., Scotland and America in the Age of the 
Enlightenment (Edinburgh, 1990), 1–2, 8–10; Samuel Fleischacker, “Adam Smith’s 
Reception among the American Founders, 1776–1790,” William and Mary Quarterly
59 (2002), 897–924; Samuel Fleischacker, “The Impact on America: Scottish 
Philosophy and the American Founding”, in Alexander Broadie, ed., The Cambridge 
Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment (Cambridge, 2003), 324–8; Mark G. 
Spencer, David Hume and Eighteenth-Century America (Rochester, 2005).
9 Melvin Yazawa, From Colonies to Commonwealth: Familial Ideology and the 
Beginnings of the American Republic (Baltimore, 1985), 2, 19–22; Fliegelman, 
Prodigals and Pilgrims, 29, 51, 194, 229, 181–2; the phrase “habituation” occurs on 51.
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Scottish moral philosophers, were also limited in scope and power. The 
power of affection and benevolence was commonly understood to be 
inversely proportional to the distance between humans; in other words, 
the shorter the distance, the stronger the ties of affection among them. 
Thus the strongest sentiments of affection were claimed to exist within 
the family but weakened with growing distance from that center. Adam 
Smith, for instance, in his Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759), argued that 
love for the self was followed in strength by affection involving family 
members. More distant kinship relations, however, would result in less 
affection, since “affection gradually diminishes as the relation grows 
more and more remote.”10
Americans also shared the notion about the power of affection as 
being naturally related to distance. Thomas Jefferson, for instance, 
articulated the gravitational nature of human affection by describing the 
affectionate ties connecting members of Indian communities in his Notes 
on the State of Virginia (1781). He argued that these bonds weakened with 
growing distance between individuals, being the strongest among members 
of the family. In an effort to debate the claim about the inferiority of the 
New World to Europe, he argued that the Native American male showed 
no difference from his white counterpart in terms of affection, including its 
decreasing power with growing distance: “he is affectionate to his 
children,” Jefferson claims, “his other connections weakening, as with us, 
from circle to circle, as they recede from the center.”11
10 Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) (Indianapolis, 1982; reprint of the 
Oxford University Press edition of 1976), 219, 220, 223–4. As Fonna Forman-
Barzilai has shown, rewriting the Stoic tradition Smith denied the possibility of 
developing sympathy in a “cosmopolitan” manner refuting the gravitational model by 
practicing “apathy,” i.e. the refusal to feel greater sympathy for others within the 
innermost circles of one’s world. Fonna Forman-Barzilai, Adam Smith and the Circles 
of Sympathy: Cosmopolitanism and Moral Theory (Cambridge, 2010), 5, 8, 19–20, 
120–34. Smith, The Theory of Moral Sentiments 223–4. For Smith’s conception of the 
limitations on sympathy see also Fleischacker, “Adam Smith’s Reception,” 918.
11 In The Portable Thomas Jefferson, ed. Merrill D. Peterson (Harmondsworth, 1975),
96. Contemporary thinking about sentimental power was also restrictive in a different 
way. In the public sphere, the adaptation and production of the ideas of 
sentimentalism as well as their dissemination was confined to those having the power 
of articulating them. While the power of sensibility was acknowledged in the case of 
disadvantaged social groups such as women, they were excluded from political 
sentimentalism. Blacks or native Americans could be felt compassion for, but their 
sentimental powers were deemed inferior to those of whites. Waldstreicher, In the 
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Nevertheless, the limits of affection were not regarded as absolute. 
The power of sensibility was seen ideally to extend from the individual 
through ever expanding social circles, morality becoming associated with 
a “singular humanity.” For eighteenth-century Americans, limiting 
affection to the local sphere was the subject of disapproval. Instead, they 
argued, one should be able to have affections reaching over beyond the 
boundaries of narrow locality. Failure to do so equaled presenting oneself 
uneducated, lacking refinement and civilized affection. Americans even 
went so far as to consider themselves cosmopolitans, able to cross 
boundaries of locality and in Sarah Knott’s words, “enter into the hearts 
of even those who were different.” Ultimately, they found themselves 
being capable of feeling sympathy for all mankind.12 The understanding 
that compassion was a fundamental human trait served as a ground for 
connecting the reform of the political framework of the nation with the 
burgeoning culture of sensibility.
Hence it is understandable that the debate over the ratification of the 
constitution in general, as Sarah Knott has argued, could lie “in part on 
sentimental foundations,” with the problem of affection informing both 
sides of the debate. Sentimentalism represented a significant line of 
argumentation in the national discussion helping to address issues mainly 
related to the problem of representation. Anti-Federalists developed their 
argument centering upon affection in relation to their claim about the 
viability of the republican order in small republics, i.e. individual states. 
They posited a difference between people’s attitude toward the local 
governments represented by the states and the federal one having an 
impact on their understanding of political sympathy. Arguing that local 
authority had a stronger command for people’s loyalty than distant ones 
they questioned the success of the proposed federal government in 
winning the support of the people. They also regarded distance as 
undermining the good relationship between the people and their 
representatives by making it possible for men unworthy to rise into power 
ultimately subverting the liberty of the people. “Small republics,” such as 
states, by contrast, in Saul Cornell’s words, would secure the 
representatives’ “ties to local communities.” Thus Anti-Federalists were 
Midst of Perpetual Fetes, 55, 82; Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, 228, 
232–3, 237–8.
12 Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, 201, 208 (first quotation); Wood, 
Radicalism of the American Revolution, 221, 222 (second quotation), 223.
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aware of the “gravitational model of human relations” (in John Saillant’s 
phrase) and accepted that its force was inversely proportional to the 
distance between persons, and hence strongest within the domestic 
sphere, weakening with distance.13
Consequently, Anti-Federalists argued that physical proximity 
between the people and their representatives was an essential condition 
for confidence and affection to develop within the former. It was only 
through proximity, they believed, that the people could know their 
representatives and would accept the laws made by them. Thus their 
preference for the small republic model translated into sentimental
discourse. It was only through proximity, they believed, that the people 
could take cognizance of their representatives and would accept the laws 
made by them. Hence it was an essential condition for confidence and 
affection to develop within the former. According to anti-Federalists, in 
Cornell’s words, the states provided a better chance for “politicians … to 
demonstrate a capacity for sympathy with those they represented”.14 Anti-
13 Knott, Sensibility and the American Revolution, 238–9, 39 (first quotation); Saul 
Cornell, The Other Founders: Anti-Federalism and the Dissenting Tradition in 
America, 1788–1828 (Chapel Hill and Williamsburg, 1999), 62–64, 72, 73 (second 
quotation). John Saillant, “Black, White, and ‘The Charitable Blessed’: Race and 
Philanthropy in the American Early Republic,” in Essays on Philanthropy, no. 8. 
(Indianapolis, 1993), 5, footnote 6 (third quotation). One of the anti-Federalists, 
publishing under the pseudonym “Cato” of New York, for instance, argued, “The 
strongest principle of union resides within our domestic walls. … as we depart from 
home, the next general principle of union is amongst citizens of the same state, whose 
acquaintance, habits, and fortunes, nourish affection, and attachment…” The 
Complete Anti-Federalist, ed. Herbert Storing (Chicago and London, 1981), 2: 112.
14 “Brutus” in The Complete Anti-Federalist, 2: 369 and “Pennsylvania Farmer” in ibid, 
2: 232–3. Cornell, The Other Founders, 80 (third quotation). See also Knott, 
Sensibility and the American Revolution, 243. Perhaps the most sophisticated and 
articulate of all New York anti-Federalists, businessman Melancton Smith made 
extensive use of the sentimental argument in discussing the problem of representation. 
As he explored in his speech of 21 June 1788 in the New York convention, the greater 
number of federal representatives was preferable because in that way people could 
elect magistrates similar to themselves, otherwise the latter would have no idea of the 
sentiments that they were also supposed to share with their constituents. 
“Representatives,” Smith claimed are to “resemble those they represent: they should 
be a true picture of the people; possess the knowledge of their circumstances and 
wants; sympathize in all their distresses, and be disposed to seek their true interests.” 
This was a clear formulation of sentimental proximity as an indispensable basis of 
compassion that formed the foundations of true representation for Smith, believing 
knowledge and sympathy being intertwined with each other. This was also why Smith 
113
Federalists thus identified one kind of affection and sympathy as for their
origins: the natural one existing at the local level only, between state 
governments and the people and denied its existence at the federal level, 
where they perceived magistrates too distant from the people to have their 
affection and sympathy. Yet, their argument concerning political 
sympathy was one that Publius had to reckon with and responded to their 
apprehension also using the same language of sensibility, as will be seen, 
at the same time managing to integrate it into his own persuasion.
Publius also understood the general role of affection in political 
affairs as vital, and although being advocates of the new constitution and 
the large republic as against the small one Hamilton, Jay, and Madison, in 
fact, counted with the concept of the gravitational model. Such scheme
appeared in their application of the discourse of affection by nature in 
view of the states and the people. Due to the force of proximity, in their 
argument, state governments would stand a better chance of winning the 
affection and loyalty of the people than the federal government being at a 
greater distance from them. As Hamilton explains in the Seventeenth 
Federalist reverberating the teachings of the Scottish school: “Upon the 
same principle that a man is more attached to his family than to his 
neighborhood, to his neighborhood than to the community at large, the 
people of each state would be apt to feel a stronger bias towards their 
local governments than towards the government of the Union.”15 The 
force of affection between the people and state governments can be such 
because of its natural source derived from the gravitational model.
argued that “the great” or the upper class could not be good representatives of the 
people. They “do not feel for the poor and middling class.” They can have no way of 
sharing feelings of the latter, their material conditions being basically different. In 
Smith’s words, “They feel not the inconveniences arising from the payment of small 
sums.” The Complete Anti-Federalist, 6: 157 (first quotation, emphasis added), ibid, 
158 (second, third and fourth quotation, emphasis added). In his eyes, this lack of 
compassion was a basic impediment to their fitness for representing the people at the 
federal level.
15 Federalist, 157. Jack Rakove makes the claim that in their method of argumentation 
anti-Federalists tended to be “Newtonians” in the sense that they applied axiomatic 
claims about government, also being prone to making “generalizations,” whereas 
Federalists were more into “experimenting” with the new system. The gravitational 
model as accepted and used by Publius, itself based on axioms, however, seems to 
have been an exception to Rakove’s claim and very close to, in fact, mimetic of 
Newtonian tenets. Rakove, Original Meanings, 152 (first quotation), 153 (second 
quotation), 152 (third quotation).
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At the same time, it is not only with regard to the people within the 
context of the state that Publius asserts the power of affectionate ties 
rooted in natural circumstances, since for him, the natural force of 
proximity affects not only the relationship between people and state 
governments but also the way in which federal representatives relate to 
local issues. As Madison points out in the Forty-Sixth Federalist, given 
their personal attachment to particular interests within their states the 
“legislatures of the particular States” will, in fact, be inclined to promote 
local interests. As he complains, “a great proportion of the errors 
committed by the State legislatures proceeds from the disposition of the 
members to sacrifice the comprehensive and permanent interest of the 
State to the particular and separate views of the counties or districts in 
which they reside.” This natural bias for the local, in turn, makes state 
legislatures in Madison’s eyes incapable of promoting national interests. By 
the same logic, “the members of the federal legislature will be likely to 
attach themselves too much to local objects.” Policies made on the national 
level, therefore, will lean toward local concerns, “the prejudices, interests, 
and pursuits of the governments and people of the individual states.”16 This 
situation is to be changed for the better by the proposed constitution.
The natural source of affection also takes on a positive tone in the 
argument of Madison when it comes to the issue of defense through the 
militia. It is also the loyalty and affection of the people connecting them 
to their state governments that will prevent the federal one from going 
tyrannical by relying on military force according to Madison. As he argues 
in the Forty-Sixth Federalist, state militias with “citizens” in “arms” would 
be ready to protect state governments from such an assault, because these 
militias would be “fighting for their common liberties and united and 
conducted by governments possessing their affections and confidence.”17 In 
this way, the sympathy of citizens for their state governments rooted in the 
power of natural physical proximity would function as a guarantee against 
the potential abuse of power by the federal government.
While accepting the power of local sentiments, Publius had to deal 
with the problem of the tension between the gravitational model and his 
advocacy of the large republic, also manifest in the issue of affection at 
the national or federal level: how can loyalty to the Union work if the 
power of local attachments stemming from the gravitational model exists 
16 Federalist, 299.
17 Ibid, 301.
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by nature? He strove to solve this problem by employing the double 
discourse of the origins of affection to argue that affective ties exist not 
only at the local but also at the federal level and moreover, not only of 
artificial but also of natural sources thereby ensuring coherence within the 
Union. Therefore, despite admitting the natural origins of sympathy at the 
state level, Publius also distinguished sympathy and affection in relation 
to the federal government developing an argument that emphasized the 
artificial origins of the relationship between the people and the federal 
government.18
According to the authors of The Federalist, ties of affection are 
possible and necessary to develop at the federal level by means of the 
proposed constitution to serve cohesion within the union. Although 
natural bonds of sympathy and affection constitute an important ground 
for affection in political units, Publius questions the durability of such 
ties. Hamilton, for instance, in the Twenty-Fourth Federalist, points out 
that even international relations based on kinship ties are susceptible to 
deterioration. His example is the great powers of Spain and France in the 
context of North America, where the “common interest” of Spain and 
Britain in the West may bring these two rivals together against the 
American States. This can happen, without disturbance by the French-
Spanish alliance, since, although being based on blood ties, it is bound to 
deteriorate. The reason is the perishable nature of kinship ties: “The 
increasing remoteness of consanguinity,” Hamilton claims, “is every day 
diminishing the force of the family compact between France and Spain.” 
This for him is in accordance with the view that “the ties of blood” are 
“feeble and precarious links of political connection.”19 Thus, the 
gravitational model also works in view of time for Hamilton: with 
growing temporal distance, even kinship ties may weaken and wear away 
thereby leading to the end of political alliances.
18 In doing so he also hoped to make the latter more visible to the former. Historian Max 
Edling has argued that the framing was grounded in the American political cultural 
tradition in the sense that the empowerment of the central government was to happen 
without jeopardizing citizens’ liberties keeping it “inconspicuous” to them, having 
“limited … actual physical presence.” Nonetheless, being aware of the sentimental 
features of the argument of Publius, as will be seen below, it becomes clear that for 
him the issue was to bring the federal government closer to citizens in several ways, 
in fact, making it “conspicuous” to them. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of 
Government 9, 10 (first quotation, original emphasis).
19 Federalist, 191.
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The perishable feature of natural ties of affection prepares the 
ground for Publius to argue the possibility of their generation by human 
effort in an artificial manner. Consequently, for him, the nation is in part 
held together by bonds of affection that develop through time, largely 
generated by habit as if they were the result of historical processes, of 
habitual development affecting the sphere of the whole Union. As for ties 
connecting citizens of the nation, in the Second Federalist, Jay makes the 
point that Americans are connected by cultural ties such as language or 
religion, “the same principles of government,” “very similar manners, and 
customs,” but more interestingly, the revolutionary experience. In a 
similar vein, in the Fourteenth Federalist, Madison also posits ties among 
members of the Union other than the ones based on blood, i.e. rooted in 
nature. For him, the shared revolutionary experience of Americans 
established strong bonds among them, resting on “the mingled blood 
which they have shed in defense of their sacred rights….”20 Thus, for Jay 
and Madison, the American nation is also connected by bonds of affection 
that are the result of custom and habit, stemming from cultural ties that 
have developed through time. In their reasoning, the (federal) nation, in 
part, becomes the outcome of historical processes: the development of 
affection is the result of common experience and habit. 
Another artificial source of political affection and sympathy for 
Publius is the federal legal system expected to create bonds of sympathy 
between representatives and the people. In the first place, these get 
generated through the system of laws. Since the same laws would apply to 
the former as much as to the latter, legislators would refuse to make laws 
that would harm themselves, consequently, such laws would not harm the 
people, the electorate. As Hamilton claims in the Thirty-Sixth Federalist, 
“dependence, and the necessity of being bound, himself and his posterity, 
by the laws to which he gives his assent are the true and they are the 
strong cords of sympathy between the representative and the constituent.” 
Hence physical distance on the scale of the federal Union otherwise 
serving as a natural barrier between federal representatives and their 
electorate can be compensated for by laws as artificial means of 
generating sympathy, since they will equally affect law-makers and other 
citizens. The laws that federal representatives will make, as Hamilton 
confirms in the Fifty-Seventh Federalist, will be effective for them like 
for the people. As a result, a “communion of interests and sympathy of 
20 Ibid, 91, 144.
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sentiments” will develop between them forming a strong basis for 
political stability.21 Thus the sympathy that is to bind “rulers” and 
“people” into one federal political “communion” can in part be created by 
artificial means, by the principle of equality before law.
According to Publius, a similar kind of political mechanism bound 
to create artificial bonds of sympathy within the federal union lies in the 
system of elections. As Madison explains in the Fifty-Second Federalist, 
federal representatives are required to “have an immediate dependence on 
and intimate sympathy with, the people”—a condition to be ensured by 
regularly sending the representatives back to the electorate: “Frequent 
elections are unquestionably the only policy by which this dependence 
and sympathy can be effectually secured,” Madison claims. He confirms 
this role of the election adding that the process is also bound to generate 
apprehension in federal magistrates. In the Fifty-Seventh Federalist he 
details the psychological mechanism that representatives are exposed to 
as a result of elections. According to him, the latter would trigger a 
process of cognition through which magistrates will remember that they 
are only temporarily raised from among the people and with the next 
election will “descend” back unless being re-elected.22
In the Fifty-Seventh Federalist Madison further explores the 
discourse of affection between federal representatives and the electorate 
as a result of gratitude through the artificial means of election in their 
relationship. He claims that the former are attached to the latter because 
of gratitude derived from the fact of their being elected, having received 
the favors of the people. In this way, representatives “will enter into the 
public service under circumstances which cannot fail to produce a 
temporary affection at least to their constituents.” It is the ubiquitous 
“sensibility” of humans that, also being an attribute of federal 
representatives, is the condition of the working of such an emotional 
transaction that will result in their “affection” felt toward the electorate: 
“There is in every breast a sensibility to marks of honor, of favor, of 
esteem, and of confidence,” Madison points out, “which, apart from all 
considerations of interests, is some pledge for grateful and benevolent 
returns.”23
21 Ibid, 235 (first quotation), 345 (second quotation).
22 Ibid, 323–4 (first quotation), 324 (second quotation), 344–5 (third quotation)
23 Ibid, 344.
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The dependence of representatives on the electorate through the 
process of elections, at the same time, promotes the generation of 
sympathy in another sense. As Hamilton argues in the Thirty-Sixth 
Federalist, magistrates are to be well informed about the sentiments of 
the people in order to be able to win their votes. “Is it not natural,” he 
asks, “that a man who is a candidate for the favor of the people, and who 
is dependent on the suffrages of his fellow-citizens for the continuance of 
his public honors, should take care to inform himself of their dispositions 
and inclinations and should be willing to allow them their proper degree 
of influence upon his conduct?”24 In other words, Hamilton here strives to 
refute the anti-Federalist argument about the ignorance of federal 
representatives attributed to their distance from constituents. Through 
increasing their knowledge of distant voters magistrates can, in fact, 
bridge the gap. Such an urge to acquire intimate knowledge of the 
sentiment of the people, according to Hamilton, can in turn develop in 
representatives as a result of the system of election, a further mechanical 
way of establishing proximity at the federal level.
Federal representatives, then, by the institutional means of the legal 
system and elections will have the tendency under the proposed 
constitution to develop affective ties with the people, temporary or 
permanent. These will supposedly come into being under the proposed 
constitution despite the physical distance that separates magistrates from 
their constituencies. 
Finally, the most complex means of achieving the generation of 
sympathy and affection in the people felt for their representatives is 
through “better administration” by the federal government as both 
Hamilton and Madison claim. This is an argument that Hamilton first 
offers in the Sixteenth Federalist, where he claims that the federal 
government, as opposed to the contrary desire of the Anti-Federalists, 
“must carry its agency to the persons of the citizens.” In that way, it can 
reach the innermost sentiments of the people, derived from the human 
heart. In fact, it is to compete with state governments to be able to control 
those passions. In Hamilton’s words, “The government of the Union, like 
that of each State, must be able to address itself immediately to the hopes
and fears of individuals; and to attract to its support those passions which 
have the strongest influence upon the human heart.” According to him, 
this can be best done by the presence of the federal government through 
24 Ibid, 235.
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the “courts of justice.”25 He provides a detailed exploration of the 
mechanism of achieving this development of positive sentiments for the 
federal government in the people in the Twenty-Seventh Federalist. He 
argues on the basis of the principle of proximity and frequency that the 
more directly and frequently the people are affected by direct sense 
impressions the deeper and more lasting effect those will leave on the 
former. “A thing that rarely strikes [man’s] senses will generally have but 
a transient influence on his mind,” Hamilton claims. “A government 
continually at a distance and out of sight can hardly be expected to 
interest the sensations of the people.” By the frequent and proximate 
presence of the government, in turn, people can be made to develop 
affection for it because of their increasing familiarity with it within their 
own local spheres. As he argues, “the more the citizens are accustomed to 
meet with it in the common occurrences of their political life, the more it 
is familiarized to their sight and to their feelings, the further it enters into 
those objects which touch the most sensible chords and put in motion the 
most active springs of the human heart, the greater will be the probability 
that it will conciliate the respect and attachment of the community.” 
Furthermore, all this can best be done if, in order to reduce distance 
between the people and the federal government, the latter is given more 
power to regulate “matters of internal concern,” achieving more 
familiarity with the people and win their affection.26
The observation that affection for the federal government can thus 
be generated on the basis of its more frequent presence in the local sphere 
of citizens rests on Hamilton’s premise that “Man is very much a creature 
of habit.” Consequently, people can be made to get accustomed to the 
presence of the federal government in their political lives, moreover, they 
can also develop affection for it because of its frequent effect on their 
sensations. Affection hence can develop in the people without their 
having to move beyond their local spheres. In this way, the federal 
government will gain greater legitimacy among them ultimately 
grounding its force in the natural bases of human sentiments and can 
25 Ibid, 298, 157 (first quotation, respectively), 154 (second and third quotation).
26 Ibid, 203 (first quotation), 202 (second quotation), 203 (third and fourth quotation). 
Hamilton provides no definition of “matters of internal concern,” a fact to be 
explained by his claim about the uncertainty of “distinction between internal and 
external.” (ibid, 202) Nonetheless, it seems viable to suppose that for him the areas 
designated as “internal” would include ones where he advocated a stronger presence 
of the national government (taxation, commerce or defense).
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avoid the use of force in its interaction with the people: “The more it [i.e.
the federal government] circulates through those channels and currents in 
which the passions of mankind naturally flow,” Hamilton argues, “the 
less it will require the aid of the violent and perilous expedients of 
compulsion.”27 Affection, then, according to him, can develop between 
the people and the federal government in a way that builds on natural 
propensities of the former. Thus, although being at a greater distance from 
the people than the state governments are, by building a habitual presence 
among them, by regulating their affairs, the federal government would 
have the power to evoke their confidence and affection. 
That Publius employed the argument about the artificial origins of 
affection and sympathy at the federal level was a logical consequence of 
his accepting its natural ones at the local one, based on the gravitational 
model. Even so, peculiarly, the three authors of the Papers, in fact, did 
detect bonds of sympathy and affection among the people of the Union 
that they considered natural in origin.
A crucial point made by Publius about the natural sources of 
affection at the federal level is that there is already a federal nation of 
affection the boundaries of which would merely be sanctioned by the 
proposed constitution. According to this argument, the union is not yet a 
political but already an affective community whose bonds of affection are 
derived from natural proximity rooted in kinship relations: the nation 
under the new constitution appears to be a natural entity of affectionate 
relationships. Hence the federal system would offer an adequate political 
framework for securing already existing affectionate ties among members 
of the Union as a nation. 
This is a claim in the Papers first made by Jay, who, in the Fifth 
Federalist refers to the American nation as one held together by bonds of 
“confidence” and “affection.” He, in part, grounds this statement in the 
natural argument maintaining that Americans are “one united people … 
descended from the same ancestors,” as he points out in the Second 
Federalist. In the Fourteenth Federalist, Madison develops a similar 
argument about sentimental affection among members of the Union, at 
the same time being more definite about the roots of such sentiments in 
blood ties, more precisely, the expansion of natural family ties. 
Americans, he contends, are connected through bonds of kinship: they are 
“members of the same family … [and] the kindred blood which flows in 
27 Ibid, 203.
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the veins of American citizens” ensures their belonging together. This is 
also the reason why Madison can maintain, as we saw above, that “the 
people of America” are “knit together as they are by so many cords of 
affection.”28 These bonds are, then, in part rooted in natural proximity 
based on consanguinity derived from the kinship ties that constitute the 
nation. Consequently, the Americans’ refusal to support the union under 
the proposed constitution, therefore, would equal the denial of the 
existence and effects of such natural bonds as well as the existence of the 
federal nation. Opposition to the latter would imply the rejection of not 
something new but, on the contrary, the destruction of something that has 
already been in existence.
The natural arguments about political sympathy at the federal level, 
at the same time, go beyond the assertion of kinship ties cementing the 
people into a nation. If one considers relations at the federal level other 
than those among individual citizens, in The Federalist a strong line of 
argument about affection by nature concerns the relationship between 
federal political leaders and the people. For instance, according to Jay, the 
force of affection rooted in natural blood ties also applies to federal 
politicians of the nation once their loyalty to nation is tested against the 
destructive power of external forces: their sentiments tie them to family 
and nation first and foremost, excluding loyalty to foreign interests. As he 
argues in the Sixty-Fourth Federalist, familial ties and national 
sentiments, among others, will prevent any disloyalty on the part of the 
president and senators. “Every consideration that can influence the human 
mind,” he points out, “such as honor, oaths … the love of country, and 
family affections and attachments, afford security for their fidelity.”29
This, for instance, is the guarantee for treaties serving the national 
interest. The federal executive as well as senators, that is, figures of the 
federal system feared by anti-Federalists to be too far from the people and 
hence disloyal to them are thus defended by Jay through the natural 
argument. For him, local as well as national affective sentiments have the 
tendency to reinforce loyalty to nation as against foreign interests.
The discourse of affection by nature connecting federal 
representatives to their constitutencies also informs the claim that 
Madison makes in connection with the balance among the various 
branches of the federal government in the Forty-Ninth Federalist, where 
28 Ibid, 101 (first quotation), 91 (second quotation), 144 (third and fourth quotation).
29 Ibid, 380.
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he points out that of them it is the legislative one that is closest to the 
people of the states. Within the federal government it is this branch that 
has more influence on the people, largely because of the natural 
attachment of the latter to their representatives. The reason is that 
legislators’ immediate contact with them ensures the existence of 
affective ties between them. In addition, representatives have political 
weight on account of such ties connecting them to the people. In 
Madison’s words, “Their connections of blood, of friendship, and of 
acquaintance embrace a great proportion of the most influential part of the 
society.” Also, they are considered “more immediately the confidential 
guardians of the rights and liberties of the people.”30 In Madison’s 
argument, then, it is the natural proximity to the people that provides the 
legislative branch with a powerful position within the federal government.
Another important discussion of this natural conception of 
sympathy and affection pertaining to the people and their magistrates in 
the Federalist Papers is offered by Hamilton. He, in the Thirty-Fifth 
Federalist, strives to refute the anti-Federalists’ charge that the proposed 
federal system of representation will be restrictive, excluding several 
interests; in other words, that will not meet the desirable criterion of “an 
actual representation of all classes of the people by persons of each 
class.”31 In his reasoning, although being true, this should not be seen as a 
problem. The various classes that do not have actual representation in 
Congress will be represented by others under the proposed constitution. 
The key to this, at the same time, is the natural affinity that he assumes to 
exist between the various classes that are to be represented and the ones 
that are to represent them.
“Mechanics” and “manufacturers,” for instance, in Hamilton’s 
argument, are classes that can best be represented by “merchants.” 
Common interests serve as a ground for such an alliance, forming the 
basis of natural sympathy and affection between them. The former “know 
that the merchant is their natural patron and friend; and they are aware 
that however great the confidence they may justly feel in their own good 
sense, their interests can be more effectively promoted by the merchant 
than by themselves.” Furthermore, according to Hamilton, mechanics and 
manufacturers lack the skills that would qualify them to defend their own 
30 Ibid, 315.
31 Ibid, 233.
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interests in Congress, thus they are happy to leave the duty with 
merchants who are competent enough to argue for them. No wonder, 
then, that he calls the latter the “natural representatives” of the former. 
Sympathy by nature also informs Hamilton’s discussion of people of “the 
learned profession,” who are by nature capable of representing the 
interests of any other classes, having no equivalent interest among the 
people. Such a peculiar feature of this class qualifies it to represent any 
interest as long as it fits in with the good of the whole.32 Representatives 
of the learned profession, then, are by nature capable of promoting the 
public good and any interest of the people. Their sympathy is, in fact, 
rooted in their natural condition of not being part of any particular class 
and thus are naturally fit to represent the whole. 
Like the classes mentioned so far, the landed one also represents 
sympathy based on natural affinity and is perhaps the most homogeneous 
one in Hamilton’s assessment. It is to encompass each member of society 
connected to land, ranging from “landlord to the poorest tenant.” The 
basis of the commonality of their interests is that taxes connected to land 
will affect these people equally, according to Hamilton. As he argues, 
“Every landholder will therefore have a common interest to keep the taxes 
on land as low as possible; and common interest may always be reckoned 
upon the surest bond of sympathy.”33 Hamilton, then, posits the landed 
interest as one homogeneous class, held together by affective ties rooted 
in sympathy in a natural manner. Once a man becomes a landholder, he 
also becomes a member of a class of similar men, thus connected to them 
by natural bonds of affection. Hamilton, in fact, naturalizes, that is, 
homogenizes social classes into groups of fellow-feeling that have common 
interests by nature and thus affection promoting federal representation.
Madison also appeals to affinity naturally derived from proximity in 
relation to representation when, in the Fifty-Sixth Federalist, he argues in 
connection with the same matter of taxation that federal representatives 
also gain knowledge of local matters because of their connection with 
state legislatures. They “will probably in all cases have been members, 
and may even at the very time be members, of the State legislature, where 
all the local information and interests of the State are assembled.”34 In 
other words, Madison assigns two identities to representatives here: while 
32 Ibid, 233 (first quotation, emphasis added), 234–5, 234 (second quotation).
33 Ibid, 234.
34 Ibid, 341.
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being part of the federal structure of government, they also have 
knowledge of local affairs on account of their ties with state legislatures. 
This, however, is also to suggest that through this second identity they 
have natural bonds with their own state districts. This argument was 
obviously in response to anti-Federalist charges concerning the distance 
between federal legislators and the people.
Finally, when deliberating on the question of regulating the militia 
Publius also employs the discourse of sentimental affection by nature 
with regard to the federal level of affection. As Hamilton explores in the 
Twenty-Ninth Federalist, the militia under the control of the federal 
government would be a perfect substitute for a standing army without 
jeopardizing the people’s liberty. The reason is that members of such a 
citizens’ army would have close ties of affection with the rest of the 
nation. These bonds are, on the other hand, rooted in natural kinship ties. 
In Hamilton’s words, “Where in the name of common sense are our fears 
to end if we may not trust our sons, our brothers, our neighbors, our 
fellow-citizens?”35 Such natural ties of affection, then, are to ensure the 
natural proximity between the militia under federal control and the 
people, whose liberty it is to protect.
Having examined the state as well as federal levels of government 
in the sentimental mode offered by Publius one can conclude that the 
persuasion of The Federalist Papers was thus far from being 
homogeneous as far as the origins of political sympathy and affection 
were concerned and was, to a great extent, based on the simultaneous 
presence of the two discourses of affection facilitating a vision of the 
federal nation rooted in both natural ties of affection and in ones that were 
the result of human effort. The natural and artificial sources of affection at 
the federal level became viable and not excluding options in The
Federalist, offered to deal with the “weight” of the gravitational model of 
affection accepted by anti-Federalists and Federalists alike. As far as the 
state governments were concerned, they equivocally argued for the 
35 Ibid, 210. For anti-Federalist concerns about standing armies see Cato in The 
Complete Anti-Federalist, 2: 118. On the contemporary concept of standing armies as 
a threat to the people’s liberty and republican order in general see J. G. A. Pocock, 
Politics, Language, and Time: Essays on Political Thought and History (Chicago, 
1989 (1960), 104–146; idem, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political 
Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton, 1975), 426–7, and passim; 
Bernard Bailyn, The Ideological Origins of the American Revolution (Cambridge, 
1992 (1967)), 61–2.
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natural affection that citizens, state legislators or others were bound to 
feel for their own state governments. By contrast, when referring to the 
same problem in connection with the federal legislature Publius argued 
for the artificial origins of affection between the people and the federal 
government claiming the need to develop such ties. He regarded artificial 
bonds of affection as ones to be created by the constitution, which thus 
functioned to him as a means to exploit the gravitational model and the 
sentimental power of proximity to be created in artificial ways. 
Furthermore, the natural affective ties that anti-Federalists identified at the 
state level only Hamilton, Jay, and Madison also claimed to detect in the 
federal union as far as relations among the people themselves and between 
the people and federal representatives were concerned: the citizens of the 
country, a citizens’ army or even federal office-holders were to be 
connected to the people of the states by natural bonds of affection.36
The natural and cultural ways of defining affection in the federal 
republic hence also indicated varieties of its meaning through its origin in 
relation to nationhood in an ambiguous way. For Publius, the federal 
nation was to be regarded not only as a result of artificial, man-made ties 
of affection but also, in several ways, as a natural community based on 
ties already in place.37 In other words, the notion of associating the state 
36 The two discourses of sympathy and affection as employed in the Federalist Papers 
should be seen as part of a larger project aimed at constructing a national community 
within the framework of the federal constitution. As historian Trish Loughran has 
shown, a homogeneous national print culture with a unified audience as a material 
prerequisite for nation formation did not exist in America at the time of ratification. 
Pluralism, fragmentation, disconnectedness in print culture, inadequate means of 
communication among disparate localities were impediments to the development of a 
unified national community at the federal level. Nonetheless, by means of various 
rhetorical strategies, Publius suggested the existence of a national community, thereby 
proposing coherence and unity at the textual level before the material world of a 
federal community took shape. This community, however, is to be seen as “fantasy,” 
or desire at the time of the ratification debate. Through his strategies Publius managed 
to position his anti-Federalist adversaries as representatives of particular locality and 
confusion, promoting “chaos” and disconnectedness undermining national coherence 
represented by the newly proposed system of government, which offered, by contrast, 
ideological and “geographical coherence” through union. Trish Loughran, The 
Republic in Print: Print Culture in the Age of U.S. Nation-Building 1770–1870 (New 
York, 2007), 322, 323, 141, 3–4, 111, 139, 26, 120, 121 (first quoted phrase), 124–5, 
125 (second quoted phrase), 126 (third quoted phrase).
37 The simultaneous presence of the natural and the artificial in the argumentation of The 
Federalist can be accounted for by a peculiar feature of the contemporary culture of 
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with a community given by nature survived and hence the application of 
the ambiguous discourses of political sentimentalism by Publius fit in 
with this general tendency of political thought despite, as has been seen 
above, the general shift that had occured in sentimental culture.
The two discourses together thus served for the authors of the 
Papers to define a national community that was, in fact, yet to be 
constructed. Either imagined as being held together by already given 
bonds such as natural kinship ties and others derived from proximity, or 
affectionate bonds possible to generate through institutional means under 
the new constitution, the three authors of the Federalist Papers identified 
a political community that was also a national one based on sentimental 
affection. The complex web of affective ties as they already existed or 
were yet to be formed by the new constitution were offered, ambiguously, 
to show coherence in the would-be federal nation. In this way, despite 
their obvious differences identifed by scholars like Todd Estes, Madison, 
Hamilton, and Jay also shared significant ideas about the sentimental 
origins of the Constitution. In the first place, as has been seen, Madison 
and Hamilton emphasized both the natural and artificial origins of 
political affection and sympathy within the Union. In the second place, 
Madison, with his emphasis on the natural origins of a federal nation was 
far closer to Jay’s rhetorical strategy hinting at “national greatness” than 
one may assume on the basis of Estes’s analysis.
By employing the two discourses, presuming affection within the 
union either as a result of natural links or artificial ones, Publius thus, in 
the final analysis, glossed over the nature-culture dichotomy, implying the 
power of the constitution to both sanction and create ties of sentimental 
affection.
the constitution. As historian Eric Slauter points out, a conceptual shift from an 
organic to an architectural understanding of statehood had taken place in America by 
the 1780s. This dichotomy expressed the fundamental tension between the state as a 
natural entity and as a “state of art,” the result of human design and construction. 
Nevertheless, as Slauter suggests, the natural or organic conception of the state and 
the “body metaphor had not been abandoned” with the making of the constitution. 
Eric Slauter, The State as a Work of Art: The Cultural Origins of the Constitution
(Chicago, 2009), chapter 1, 85.
